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NO-FAULT INSURANCE IN KENTUCKY-A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
I. INMODUCMON
Although the idea of no-fault insurance is not new,' it has only
in recent years been seriously considered as an alternative to the
tort concept of negligence. The major impetus for the current interest
in no-fault insurance plans can be directly traced to the 1965 publica-
tion of the book Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim by Professors
Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell. Professors Keeton and O'Con-
nell discuss the problems they see with the present system and suggest
a new system of compensation.2 They also submit a model statute
which could easily be adopted in almost any state.3
Proponents of no-fault argue that the present system has clogged
the courts, delayed payments to injured parties, inflated claims,
caused higher insurance premiums and wasted enormous amounts of
money in legal battles over the determination of fault. The opponents
of no-fault plans contend that such plans compromise the injured
party's rights of action and in most cases completely abolish the right
to sue for pain and suffering. In addition, no-fault plans undermine
the policy of deterrence afforded by the tort liability system, by virtue
of the tortfeasor's having to pay for the harm done.
Since 1965 a variety of plans and proposals have been introduced.
Massachusetts, 4 Florida,5 Illinois6 and Puerto Rico7 have adopted no-
fault plans which are similar in basic structure to the Basic Protection
Plan of Keeton and O'Connell. Delaware,8 Minnesota, 9 Oregon 0 and
South Dakota" have adopted various plans which differ considerably
I See Smith, Lilly, & Dowling, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A
Symposium, 32 COLTJm. L. REv. 785 (1932).
2 R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION rOR = TAmc Vicamr
(1965) [hereinafter cited as BASIC PROTECTION].
RId. at 299-339.
4 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A, 34D, 34M, 34N; ch. 175, § 22E-H,
113B-C; ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1971).
5 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-.741 (1972).
' ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.150-163 (Supp. 1973).
7P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2051-65 (Supp. 1970).8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Dela-
ware Act].
9 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65B.22-.27 (Supp. 1973).10 ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 743.786-.835 (1971).
" S.D. CoNwD LAWS ANN. §§ 58-23-6, 7, 8 (Supp. 1973).
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from the Basic Protection Plan in approach and in the way in which
they affect traditional concepts of tort liability. 12
In Kentucky, a variety of proposals were introduced at the 1972
meeting of the General Assembly and it is expected that several will
be introduced in 1974. A discussion of the many different no-fault
plans is beyond the scope of this comment, so it will focus on the most
common of these plans: the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan.'3
The Basic Protection Plan and its derivatives have two main
features: (1) auto accident victims are reimbursed by their own
insurance company for all out-of-pocket losses connected with bodily
injury (medical bills, wage loss, funeral bills, etc.) without regard
to who was at fault; and (2) the traditional tort recovery for pain and
suffering is available only to those who can cross a certain threshold
established by the statute. The threshold may be stated in terms of
injuries within a specific category or in terms of expenses above a
specified level. For example, a plan that abolishes the right to re-
cover for pain and suffering unless the injury results in permanent
disability or unless the medical bills are at least $500 is a threshold
plan.1 4 The major differences in the threshold plans are the dollar
amounts chosen as the limit for reimbursement of out-of-pocket losses
and the specific threshold to be crossed before a victim is allowed to
sue for pain and suffering.
Under the Basic Protection Plan, for example, the out-of-pocket
expenses would be reimbursed up to a limit of $10,000 per person,' 5
and a suit against the negligent party could not be brought unless the
damages for out-of-pocket expenses were higher than $10,000 or the
damages for pain and suffering were higher than $5,000.1 By way of
comparison, under the Massachusetts no-fault statute,'7 out-of-pocket
22 The Delaware, Minnesota and South Dakota plans have very little, if any,
impact on tort liability. See Ghiardi & Kircher, Automobile Insurance Reparations
Plans: An Analysis of Eight Existing Laws, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 5, 55, 67 (1972).
13 Massachusetts, Florida and Illinois are _examples of states that have adopted
plans that contain the principal features of the Basic Protection Plan. It shouldbe noted that Illinois' statute was held to violate the Illinois Constitution by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474 (IMI. 1972).
14 Most no-fault plans do not encompass property damage. Although the
Basic Protection Plan originally excluded property damage, it has been amended
to include Vehicle Protection Insurance. See Keeton & 0 Connell, Alternate Paths
Toward Nonfault Automobile Insurance, 71 CoLUM. L. RBv. 241, 260-62 (1971).15 BAsrc Pnom cnoqr at 276-77, 280, 283.16Id. at 274-76. When a suit based on negligence is brought and damages are
awarded, only the amount awarded in excess of $5000 for pain and suffering and$10,000 for other items is collectible.
17 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A, 34D), 34M, 34N; ch. 175, §§ 22E-H
118B-C; ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1971).
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expenses are reimbursed up to a limit of $2000 per person s and the
victim may bring suit to recover for pain and suffering only if (1)
the reasonable and necessary medical and hospital costs exceed $500;
(2) death occurs; or (3) injury consists in whole or in part of loss of
a body member, permanent and serious disfigurement, loss of sight or
hearing, or a fracture. 19
We shall examine the obstacles a no-fault threshold plan might
face in a constitutional test under Kentucky law20 and point out ways
in which such obstacles might be avoided.
II. CoNsrrrunoNAL QUEMSoNs INVOLVED
A study of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky case law con-
struing its various provisions has revealed that four provisions of the
Kentucky Constitution present, in varying degrees of severity, ob-
stacles to the successful passage of a no-fault threshold statute. These
provisions are sections 7, 14, 54 and 241. Each section will be dis-
cussed separately with suggestions as to how constitutional problems
might be avoided.
A. Section 7
Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution states as follows:
The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred and the right
thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be
authorized by this Constitution.21
This provision has been strictly construed by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals since the adoption of the constitution as proclaiming a right
that cannot be abrogated.22 The Court of Appeals has held that a
jury may be dispensed with only in those cases in which a jury was
not customarily used at common law, such as cases involving minor
injuries or amounts in controversy and cases purely in equity.23
A basic idea included in most no-fault insurance plans is that in
less serious auto accidents, the victim will recover from his own
18 Id. § 34A.
19 Id. § 34M.
20A discussion of the constitutionality of a no-fault plan under the United
States Constitution is beyond the scope of this article. The reader is referred to
articles written by other authors on the subject. See, e.g., Martel, No-Fault Auto-
mobile Insurance in Pennsylvania-A Constitutional Analysis, 17 VmL. L. IEv. 783,
784-90 (1972); CONsTrUTONAL PROBLEMS IN AUToMoBrLE AccmErr CoNiEN-
SATiON REFORM (U.S. Dep't of Transp., Auto. Ins. & Compensation Study 1970).
21 KY. CONST. § 7.
22 Mt. Sterling v. Holly, 57 S.W. 491 (Ky. 1900), O'Connor v. Henderson
Bridge Co., 27 S.W. 251 (Ky. 1894); Stidger v. Rogers, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 52 (1801).23 Houk v. Starck, 64 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1933); King v. Commonwealth, 238
S.W. 373 (Ky. 1922); Mt. Sterling v. Holly, 57 S.W. 491 (Ky. 1900); O'Connor
v. Henderson Bridge Co., 27 S.W. 251 (Ky. 1894).
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insurance company and not be able to sue the negligent party. The
victim is generally denied his right to a jury trial to determine the
extent of his injuries. At first glance this seems to present a major
constitutional obstacle to the no-fault system. However, it should be
noted that Professors Keeton and O'Connell have stated that the
provision in their Basic Protection Plan for non-jury trials of small
claims is not essential.24 A statute could easily be drafted to provide
for a jury trial solely to determine the extent of the victim's injuries
but much time and expense would be saved by not having the jury
determine which party was at fault.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals did not squarely face the jury trial
question in connection with early cases ruling on the constitutionality
of workmen's compensation. The Kentucky Workmen's Compensation
Act passed in 1916 was held by the Kentucky Court of Appeals to be
constitutional since it was a voluntary system. 25 Under the Act an
employee is not deemed to have waived any constitutional rights to
which he is entitled until he consents in writing to accept the pro-
visions of the Act. Although the Court of Appeals held the Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1914 unconstitutional on the ground that it was
compulsory instead of voluntary,26 they did not consider the jury trial
question at any length. The major portion of the opinion was devoted
to a consideration of sections 54 and 241 of the constitution and an
explanation of the reasons why the Act violated these provisions. The
Court summarily disposed of the contention that the Act violated the
right to jury trial, along with several other questions raised, by stating
that "[a] sufficient answer to all this is that these are matters addressed
entirely to the wisdom of the Legislature and can be regulated as
necessities may require."27 In light of the strict interpretation of the
Court with regard to the right to jury trial both before and after 1914,28
it appears likely that the Court did not thoroughly consider nor
sufficiently anticipate the import of such a statement and would not
feel bound by it today.
One possible way to avoid the constitutional problem presented by
section 7 without removing the non-jury trial provision is to provide
for arbitration of small claims with the right to a trial de novo on
appeal. A provision of this type appeared in the Illinois statute29 and
was used as one basis for holding the Illinois no-fault plan uncon-
24 BASr PorEcoN at 504.
25 Greene v. Caldwell, 186 S.W. 648 (Ky. 1916).
26 Ky. State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., 170 S.W. 1166 (Ky. 1914).
27d at 1171.
28 See cases cited supra note 22.
29 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.159 (Supp. 1973).
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stitutional.30 However, the reasoning was based upon a peculiar ob-
jective of article VI of the Illinois Constitution81 which the court said
was to abolish the wasteful and duplicative process of trial de novo.32
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on the other hand, has upheld
the constitutionality of legislation providing for similar arbitration pro-
ceedings for minor auto accident cases.33 The Court determined that
arbitration with trial de novo limited but did not abrogate the right to
jury trial as it existed at common law and was constitutionally permis-
sible.
The Kentucky Constitution has not been found to have the objective
of eliminating trials de novo. In addition, the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals has repeatedly stated that arbitration is favored by the courts.34
Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals has held that an agreement
by the parties to a contract to arbitrate all of the disputes that might
arise thereunder is invalid and unenforceable, the stated reason for
not allowing such an agreement is that it is an attempt to oust the
courts of their jurisdiction.35 However, if there were a provision for a
trial de novo on appeal, the courts would not be deprived of their
jurisdiction, especially if it were required that the arbitration proceed-
ing be initiated by the filing of a complaint in the circuit court and
that the award be entered by the court in its record of judgments to
have the effect of a final judgment upon the parties unless reversed on
appeal. This last provision would also meet the requirements of the
Kentucky statutes which provide that a question must be submitted
to arbitration by order of the court36 and that an award must be
entered as a judgment of the court unless set aside.37 The Kentucky
statutes also indicate that an agreement to submit a matter to arbitra-
tion will be binding only if it is in writing and states the matter to be sub-
mitted along with the names of the arbitrators.38 However, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals has held that where parties have agreed on a
SO Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474, 480-81 (MII. 1972).
31 ILL. CONST. art. VI.
32 Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474, 480-81 (11I. 1972).
33 Application of Smith, 112 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1955).
34 See, e.g., Smith v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 253 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. 1952);
Upington v. Commonwealth Ins. Co of N.Y., 182 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1944); Gen.
Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Harmon, 157 S.W.2d 126 (Ky. 1941); Poggel v. Louisville
R.R., 10 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1928).
5 Jones v. Jones, 16 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1929); Ison v. Wright, 55 S.W. 202
(Ky. 1900); Gaither v. Dougherty, 38 S.W. 2 (Ky. 1896); International Bd. of
Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 1102, AFL-CIO v. Wadsworth Elec. Mfg. Co.,
240 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Ky. 1965).
36 Ky. REv. STAT. § 417.011 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
3 KRS § 417.017.
88 KRS § 417.010.
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method of arbitration pursuant to a statute or statutory regulation,
such agreements are valid.39 Therefore, if a no-fault statute were
upheld on the basis of implied consent as discussed infra, the parties
involved could be deemed to have consented to the method of arbitra-
tion provided by the no-fault statute. If on the other hand, a con-
stitutional amendment were passed to validate a no-fault statute, this
entire problem could be eliminated by way of the amendment.
In summary, whether a no-fault plan in Kentucky provides for
arbitration of small claims with the right to trial de novo on appeal or
for a jury trial on the extent of injuries in a small claim, it seems likely
that the plan would not be held to violate section 7 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
B. Section 14
All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done him
in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay.40
The next question to be considered is whether the threshold feature
of no-fault plans, which abolishes tort actions for pain and suffering in
minor cases, is violative of section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution. A
similar provision of the Massachusetts Constitution was considered
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Pinnick v. Cleary
4l
where the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Massachusetts
no-fault statute. Article 11 of the Massachusetts Constitution guar-
antees "a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all
injuries or wrongs which... [one] may receive...." The Court found
that this article had been construed by Massachusetts courts as directed
toward the preservation of procedural rights and determined that it
had no ramifications in the area of substantive rights. In holding that
article 11 did not prohibit alterations of common law rights as such,
the Court added that "changes in prior law are necessary in any
ordered society....-42
A provision similar to section 14 is found in article II, section 6 of
the Colorado Constitution. When presented with the question, the
Colorado Supreme Court refused to hold that the state's automobile
guest statute violated the constitutional provision even though the
39 Northern States Contracting Co. v. Swope, 111 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1937);
Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Harris, 84 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1935).
40 Ky. CONST. § 14.




statute abolished, in most cases, a guest passenger's right to sue the
driver of the car in which he was riding.43 The Court explained that
such provisions are designed to insure that when a legal wrong has
been committed the victim cannot afterwards be denied a remedy;
such provisions are not designed to "'. . . preserve existing duties
against legislative change made before the breach occurs."' 44
Even though provisions similar to section 14 of the Kentucky Con-
stitution have been interpreted in many states as intended only to
protect procedural rights and not to act as a restraint on the legislature,
Kentucky's provision has been more strictly construed. In the case of
Ludwig v. Johnson,45 the Court of Appeals was faced with the question
of the constitutionality of Kentucky's automobile guest statute, which
barred a tort action by a guest in an automobile unless the host was
intentionally reckless. In holding that the statute was unconstitutional,
the Court stated:
It was the manifest purpose of the framers of that instrument [the
constitution] to preserve and perpetuate the common-law right of
a citizen injured by the negligent act of another to sue to recover
damages for his injury. The imperative mandate of section 14 is
that every person, for an injury done him in his person shall have
remedy by due course of law.46
In the recent case of Saylor v. Hall,4 7 the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals recognized that many states have construed their state constitu-
tions as not forbidding "... . the creation of new rights or the abolition
of old ones recognized by the common law . . " provided the legisla-
tion is to attain a permissible objective. Hence these states have
experienced no difficulty in upholding compulsory workmen's com-
pensation laws and automobile guest passenger statutes. 48 But the
Court of Appeals pointed out that the Kentucky Constitution "has
been held to prohibit the legislative branch from abolishing common-
law rights of action for injuries to the person caused by negligence or
for death caused by negligence."49
It should also be noted that the Court of Appeals has on numerous
occasions indicated the importance of a person's right to recover
damages for pain and suffering.50 On one occasion, the Court felt
impelled to state:
43 Vogts v. Guerette, 351 P.2d 851 (Colo. 1960).
44 Id. at 854-55.
45 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
46 Id. at 351.
47 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
48 Id. at 221-22.
49 Id.50 See, e.g., Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Brady, 66 S.W.2d 57 (Ky.
1933); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Wright, 54 S.W.2d 666 (Ky. 1932).
[Vol. 62.
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The right to recover of a wrongdoer compensation or allowance
looking toward recompense for pain and suffering caused by him
has been everywhere recognized as a fundamental and cardinal
principle of law, because it is naturally connected with all physical
injuries and must be considered as a direct and proximate result. 1
The strict construction of section 14 followed by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals and the Court's stated belief in the right to sue for
pain and suffering could present a serious obstacle to a no-fault statute
in Kentucky which incorporates the threshold approach. It has been
noted that the Court of Appeals has historically refused to allow the
General Assembly to abolish the common-law right to sue for injuries
caused by another's negligence, and there is no indication that the
Court would take a different position with respect to the abolition of
the right to sue for pain and suffering in minor accident cases.
C. Section 54
Another important question that will arise in connection with a
no-fault threshold plan in Kentucky is the effect of section 54 on such
a plan. This section provides:
The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to
be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to
person or property.52
Professors Keeton and O'Connell apparently concede that pro-
visions such as section 54 would bar implementation of their Basic
Protection Plan by state legislatures:
The constitutions of a few states expressly forbid the enact-
ment of any law limiting the amount recoverable for personal in-
juries and death.. .. In the past these provisions stood squarely
in the way of enacting a compulsory workmen's compensation
statute.... Similarly, such provisions would seem to stand clearly
in the way of enacting the basic protection system .... It should
be noted that Massachusetts and most other states present no prob-
lem in this regard since they are without any constitutional pro-
vision proscribing the enactment of laws limiting damages for per-
sonal injury.53
As was noted earlier,54 the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation
Act of 1914 was held unconstitutional as violative of section 54. The
Act was found to be compulsory on the employee and hence any
cause of action he might have against his employer was taken away
51 Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Brady, 66 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Ky. 1933).
52Ky. CONST. § 54.
53 BAsIc PROTcroN at 504-05 (citations omitted).
54 See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
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without a voluntary waiver on his part. The Court had no difficulty
in determining that the legislature had no power to do this: "[t]he law
has no right to force him to accept the compensation fixed by this
board by depriving him of his causes of action."55
It must be recognized that there is a basic difference between a
compulsory no-fault insurance plan and a compulsory workmen's
compensation statute. The workmen's compensation statute was de-
signed to put an upper limit on the amount that could be recovered
by an injured employee. The no-fault plan, on the other hand, puts
no upper limit on the amount that can be recovered. If the victim can
cross the stated threshold, he is allowed to recover any amount prov-
able as damages. Hence it could be argued, that the no-fault plan
does not put a limit on the amount that can be recovered. It merely
takes away a cause of action for pain and suffering in minor cases
and this is not prohibited by section 54.
The Court of Appeals dealt with such an argument when it con-
sidered the constitutionality of Kentucky's guest passenger statute in
Ludwig v. Johnson.16 It was contended that section 54 was not de-
signed to prevent the Legislature from abolishing causes of action:
It is insisted that this section of the Constitution does not guarantee
the continuation of the right of action theretofore existent, but
merely applies to such causes of action as continue to exist, and
prohibits the Legislature from limiting the amount of damages to
be recovered for the injuries resulting in death or for injuries to
person or property so long as a right of action exists for such in-
juries, but does not prohibit it from abolishing the right of action.57
The Court, however, was not persuaded by this argument:
When that section is read in connection with other sections of the
same instrument, such as sections 14 and 241, the conclusion is in-
escapable that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was
to inhibit the Legislature from abolishing rights of action for
damages for death or injuries caused by negligence.58
Thus, it appears that the Court of Appeals has taken a definite
stand on the right of the Legislature to abolish a cause of action and
it can be expected that the Court will find that a no-fault plan which
incorporates a threshold is violative of section 54 in that it abolishes
the tort action for pain and suffering of many accident victims.
55 Ky. State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., 170 S.W. 1166, 1169 (Ky.
1914).
56 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).





The final constitutional provision which might present an obstacle
to the implementation of a no-fault plan in Kentucky is section 241.
That section provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury in-
flicted by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every such case,
damages may be recovered for such death, from the corporations
and persons so causing the same .... 59
This provision has been strictly construed by the Court of Appeals
as preventing the legislature from abolishing tort actions in death
cases. Kentucky's guest passenger statute was held to clearly con-
travene section 241 since it took away the right to recover for death
resulting from negligence or resulting from a wrongful act amounting
to anything less than an intentional act.60 Quoting from an earlier
case, the Court stated:
"It was the manifest intention of the constitutional provision quoted
[section 241] to allow an action to be maintained whenever the
death of a person was caused by the negligent or wrongful act of
another and it is not within the power of the Legislature to deny
this right of action. The section is as comprehensive as language
can make it."61
The Court has found that a cause of action for death does not exist
under the constitution only in those cases in which such an action did
not exist at the time the constitution was adopted, such as actions
against a charitable institution62 or against a municipal corporation
performing a duty which the municipality owed to the public. 63 In
these cases a cause of action for death was not taken away; such a
cause of action never existed at common law.
In spite of the strict construction of section 241, this provision is
59 The remainder of the provision states as follows:
... Until otherwise provided by law, the action to recover such damages
shall in all cases be prosecuted by the personal representative of the
deceased person. The General Assembly may provide how the recovery
shall go and to whom belong; and until such provision is made, the same
shall form part of the personal estate of the deceased person.
60 Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
61 Id. at 349, quoting from Howard's Adm r v. Hunter, 104 S.W. 723, 724
(Ky. 1907). Also see text accompanying note 58 supra.62 St. Walburg Monastery of Benedictine Sisters of Covington, Ky., Inc. v.
Feitners Adm'r, 275 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1955); Cook v. John V. Norton Memorial
Infirmary, 202 S.W. 874 (Ky. 1918). Note, however, that the charitable immunity
doctrine has recently been eliminated in Kentucky. See Mullikin v. Jewish Hospital
Ass'n of Louisville, 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1961).63 Twymans Adir v. Board of Councilmen of Frankfort, 78 S.W. 446(KY. 1904).
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not likely to present a serious obstacle to the implementation of a no-
fault plan in Kentucky. The problem could easily be avoided if the
plan left the present tort action available in death cases. Although the
Basic Protection Plan was not designed in this way, most of the no-
fault plans adopted in other states place no restriction on tort recovery
in death cases. 64 Since the most serious problems intended to be
eliminated by a no-fault plan are related to claims for pain and suffering
in minor cases, leaving the present tort liability in death cases intact
would not seriously impair a no-fault plan.
E. Implied Consent
It can be argued that despite the constitutional problems presented
by sections 7, 14, 54 and 241 of the Kentucky Constitution, a no-fault
threshold plan could be held constitutional in Kentucky on the ground
that each person who uses the highways of Kentucky impliedly con-
sents to accept the provisions of the no-fault plan and waives any
constitutional objections he may have to such a plan. Such a statement
of implied consent could be drafted into the statute.
The implied consent doctrine was held constitutional in relation
to the Kentucky statute65 which provides that a person's driver's license
may be revoked if he refuses to take a chemical test to determine the
alcoholic content of his blood, breath, urine or saliva after he has been
arrested for allegedly driving while under the influence of intoxicating
beverages. 66 The statute states that "[a]ny person who operates a
motor vehicle in this state is deemed to have given his consent" to
such a chemical test.67 The statute was held not to violate the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Ken-
tucky Constitutions even though the driver's license is revoked before
a hearing is held. The Court of Appeals reasoned that this is a valid
exercise of the state's police power and that the statute provides for
a hearing to be held soon after the license is revoked. The Court
pointed out that the public must be protected against the improper
use of a motor vehicle.
It must be noted that there are basic differences between implied
consent in connection with a chemical test in drunk driving cases and
implied consent in connection with giving up the right to sue as
given by the Kentucky Constitution. The implied consent doctrine in
64 Delaware, Florida, Illinois and Massachusetts, for example. See Ghiardi &
Kircher, supra note 12.65 KRS § 186.565.
66 Craig v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. 1971).
67 KRS § 186.565(1).
[Vol. 62
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connection with a chemical test is based on the strong public policy of
protecting the public from drunken drivers whereas the no-fault plan
seems to be based only on the public policy of clearing the court
dockets and providing faster and more certain recovery for the injured
parties. Also, under the statute providing for a chemical test, unlike
the no-fault plan, a person is not impliedly consenting to waive basic
rights specifically delineated in the constitution such as those provided
by sections 7, 14, 54 and 241. In addition, implied consent under a
no-fault plan would have to be attributed to persons other than those
driving automobiles on the highways. The implied consent would
have to be extended to passengers and pedestrians as well.
If an attempt is made to circumvent the constitutional problems by
using implied consent, a provision would have to be made for obtaining
consent for persons under legal disability. The most obvious method
for obtaining such consent would be to allow the parent or legal
guardian of a person under legal disability to impliedly consent for
such person. This, however, would present serious constitutional
problems. This would permit one person to waive specific constitu-
tional rights of another person. Constitutional rights have always
been cherished rights and neither the Workman's Compensation Act
nor the statute dealing with a chemical test for alcoholic content in
the blood allows one person to waive the constitutional rights of
another. Each person can consent or "impliedly" consent to a waiver
of his constitutional rights only. In addition, the rights of persons
under some legal disability have always been carefully protected by
our law. Under the present law, for example, the statute of limitations
with respect to any cause of action does not begin to run against a
person under a legal disability until the disability is removed. 68 Thus
if a child of age eight is injured by some negligent person, the period
of one year69 in which he has to bring suit against the negligent
person does not begin to run until the child reaches the age of legal
majority. The child is protected until he is old enough to make his own
decision; another person is not allowed to make the decision of whether
or not to bring suit for the child.
In view of the fact that the law has always felt a need to protect
people under legal disability, it seems likely that the Kentucky Court
of Appeals will take a dim view of a law which allows a person to con-
sent for another person to a law which takes away basic constitutional
rights.
0s KRS § 413.170.
69 I1S § 413.140(a).
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III. ALTERNATIVES
A workable alternative to a compulsory no-fault threshold plan is
the plan which was adopted in Delaware and became effective Jan-
uary 1, 1972.70 Under this plan, each owner of a motor vehicle must
purchase certain types of insurance coverage in order to be allowed
to operate his vehicle in Delaware.71 Four types of insurance coverage
are required by the Delaware law, one of which is liability coverage.
The other three provide first party benefits and include bodily injury
protection, non-vehicular property damage and collision coverage.7 2
Although these coverages are required they may be written subject
to certain deductibles that could apply to the named insured only or
to him and members of his household and would be a matter of
election by the named insured.73
Even though the plan requires every automobile owner to carry
insurance which provides first party benefits, the Delaware plan has
very little effect on tort liability for personal injury or property damage.
The plan only prohibits those injured parties "eligible" for first party
benefits under the Act from suing the negligent party for injuries for
which first party benefits are "available."74 The prohibition applies
"without regard to any elective reductions in such coverage and
whether or not such benefits are actually recoverable." 75 Thus, this
provision prevents an injured party from collecting damages twice.
It also prohibits him from recovering the amount of a deductible that
he chose to take in his insurance coverage. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the victim's cause of action based on tort liability is not
impaired by this plan. His right of recovery still exists with respect
to any losses not covered by the first party benefits and with respect
to any losses in excess of the insurance coverage limits. His right to
sue for pain and suffering is not impaired no matter how small th.-
claim. In addition, the plan permits the ultimate burden for tho
accident losses to fall on the person responsible for the accident since
it provides that the insurer of the injured person is subrogated to th.
rights of the person to whom the benefits are paid.76
Therefore, it appears that the Delaware plan could accomplh
many of the purposes of a no-fault plan without running afoul of the
70 Delaware Act § 2118.
72 For a good discussion of the Delaware law and the different coverages
required, see Ghiardi & Kircher, supra note 12, at 5.
73 Delaware Act § 2118(a) (2)B.
74Id. § 2118(g).
75 Id.
76 Id. § 2118(f).
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Kentucky Constitution. Without abolishing any causes of action the
plan offers a method of speeding up reimbursements to injured parties
and shifts the burden of bringing suit in the smaller cases to the
injured's insurer. Moreover, the plan allows the burden of the ac-
cident to fall ultimately on the negligent party and thus provides an
element of deterrence.
As a second alternative, the legislature might decide that it is
desirable to propose a constitutional amendment which would allow
a compulsory no-fault threshold plan to be adopted. Because of the
time necessary for such an amendment to be passed, of course, the
adoption of a no-fault plan would be delayed. However, the time
required might not be any longer than the time that would pass
before a second statute could be drafted and passed if the first
statute did not withstand a constitutional test. In addition, by
proposing such an amendment and allowing the people to decide on
its passage, the legislature would be giving the people an opportunity
to indicate whether or not they would prefer a no-fault threshold
system to the present tort liability system.
IV. CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing analysis, it seems likely that a no-fault
threshold plan would face serious constitutional problems in Kentucky
unless a constitutional amendment were passed. Sections 14 and 54
of the constitution present serious obstacles to the implementation of a
no-fault threshold plan which apparently could not be overcome even
if an attempt were made to uphold the plan on the theory of implied
consent. Before a no-fault plan is adopted for Kentucky, all possible
constitutional problems should be carefully considered and serious
thought should be given to the possibility of adopting a no-fault plan
without a threshold, such as the Delaware plan, or the possibility of
first proposing a constitutional amendment and letting the people
decide for themselves which type of protection they would prefer.
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